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Abstract
Drug courts are programs for people who experience substance abuse disorders and have
been accused of a crime and are perceived as being likely to reoffend. The purpose is to
provide a therapeutic approach with reducing the risk of future offense by supporting
treatment for the defendant. Drug courts are cost-effective for state and local
governments and are often funded through a combination of state appropriations and
federal grants. Little is known how political ideology may influence the state and local
budget process that support drug courts. Using Shafritz’s power and politics theory as
the foundation, the purpose of this study was to understand the extent political ideology
influences support for drug courts by voters and judges in a single judicial district in a
Midwestern State. Survey data was first collected from 106 registered voters, with 67
usable responses, and data were analyzed using logistic regression analysis. The
registered voter results were statistically significant with 71.6% (p=.002) respondents
supporting treatment, which increased to 85.4% (p=.001) when knowing there was
judicial oversight for drug court. Through descriptive research, 45 judges participated
with findings indicating support for drug courts and no outside influences which impact
decision making. The positive social change implication stemming from this study
include recommendations to state policy makers to provide information and education
about drug courts. Following this recommendation may result in support for increased
budgetary spending to sustain drug courts. This, in turn, allows drug courts to continue,
where offenders can receive substance abuse treatment which may result in fewer drug
addicted crimes and benefiting the community and society.

Effect of Society’s Political Ideology on the Long-Term Viability of Drug Courts
by
Tiffany Kragnes

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Criminal Justice

Walden University
August 2020

Dedication
This study is dedicated to the late Iowa Supreme Court Justice Mark Cady who
sparked my interest in this study when listening to his state of the judiciary address
requesting funding for specialty courts.

Acknowledgments
This study and dissertation would not have been possible without the loving
support of my husband, Chris. Thank you for always being there and helping me through
this process. I love you.
Thank you to my committee, Dr. Anthony Fleming, who helped keep me on track
in finishing this process, and Dr. Paul Rutledge. You are two of the best professors at
Walden University and I thank you both for everything you taught me.
Finally, thank you to the support of my fellow Walden classmate David and my
colleagues Sue and Elissa who have been my support and accountability buddies
throughout this process. Thank you for the words of encouragement and advice as I
moved forward in this process.

Table of Contents
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... i
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... iv
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study..............................................................................1
Background of the Study ...............................................................................................1
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................4
Purpose...........................................................................................................................6
Research Questions ........................................................................................................7
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................8
Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................9
Definitions....................................................................................................................10
Assumptions.................................................................................................................10
Scope and Delimitations ..............................................................................................11
Limitations ...................................................................................................................11
Significance..................................................................................................................12
Summary ......................................................................................................................13
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................14
Introduction ..................................................................................................................14
Drug Court ............................................................................................................ 14
Cost Benefit/Effectiveness .................................................................................... 17
Public Opinion Influences Criminal Justice Policy .............................................. 27
i

Summary ......................................................................................................................32
Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................34
Introduction ..................................................................................................................34
Research Design and Rationale ...................................................................................34
Methodology ................................................................................................................35
Population ............................................................................................................. 36
Sampling and Sampling Procedure ....................................................................... 36
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation and Data Collection ........................... 37
Instrumentalization and Operationalization Constructs ........................................ 39
Threats to Validity .......................................................................................................41
Ethical Procedures ................................................................................................ 42
Summary ......................................................................................................................43
Chapter 4: Results ..............................................................................................................45
Introduction ..................................................................................................................45
Pilot Study....................................................................................................................45
Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 48
Results 52
Hypothesis 1.......................................................................................................... 52
Hypothesis 2.......................................................................................................... 54
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 ............................................................................. 56
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................59
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ............................................60
ii

Introduction ..................................................................................................................60
Interpretation of the Findings.......................................................................................60
Limitations of the Study...............................................................................................62
Recommendations for Future Research .......................................................................65
Implications and Conclusions ......................................................................................66
References ..........................................................................................................................68

iii

List of Tables
Table 1 Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2006................................................................. 25
Table 2 Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2016................................................................. 25
Table 3 Drug Rehabilitation in 2006 ............................................................................... 26
Table 4 Drug Rehabilitation in 2016 ............................................................................... 26
Table 5 Variable Correlation Matrix ............................................................................... 47
Table 6 Cronbach’s Alpha If Item Deleted ...................................................................... 48
Table 7 Frequency Table for Gender............................................................................... 49
Table 8 Frequency Table for Race................................................................................... 50
Table 9 Frequency Table for Political Party .................................................................. 50
Table 10 Frequency Table for District Court or Senior Status ....................................... 51
Table 11 Frequency Table for Length of Time as a Judge .............................................. 52
Table 12 Frequency Table for Political Party of Governor Who Appointed Judge ........ 52
Table 13 Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients ................................................................ 53
Table 14 Model Summary ................................................................................................. 53
Table 15 Classification Table ........................................................................................... 54
Table 16 Variables in the Equation .................................................................................. 54
Table 17 Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients ................................................................ 55
Table 18 Model Summary ................................................................................................. 55
Table 19 Classification Tables.......................................................................................... 56
Table 20 Variables in the Equation .................................................................................. 56
Table 21 Frequency Table of Public Views Affect Sentencing ......................................... 57
iv

Table 22 Frequency Table if Feel influenced by Governor .............................................. 57

v

List of Figures
Figure 1. Federal drug resources by function ................................................................... 18

vi

1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
In 1971, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” calling illegal narcotics
public enemy number one (“It is time to end,” 2009). The objective of this “war” was to
obtain a drug-free country by fighting against people who use and sell illegal drugs
(Miranda, 1998). War, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is defined as “an act of
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Miranda, 1998). The war
on drugs was not against drugs, but a war on people who use and sell illegal drugs
(Miranda, 1998). This war continues today with law enforcement requesting $9.2 billion
in funding in 2018 alone (Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP], 2017).
Further, opioid overdoses are increasing, requiring law enforcement and EMTs to carry
NARCAN to prevent an overdose death (Kennedy, 2018). Despite the benefits of
addressing the drug problem in the United States, it is important to look at the costs such
as drug courts that have been implemented.
Background of the Study
The war on drugs has accelerated arrest and incarceration rates since 1971. In
2005 and 2006, drug arrests totaled 1,846,351 and 1,889,810, respectively (“Drug War
Facts,” n.d.). Since 2006, drug arrests have hovered on average around 1.5 million each
year (“Drug War Facts,” n.d.). The total number of drug arrests in the United States in
2010 was 1,638,846 and remained consistent with a slight drop by 2017 to 1,632,921
(“Drug War Facts,” n.d.). Thus, drugs continue to affect lives and families, burden the
criminal court system, and create prison overflow.
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Drug courts were created to stem the flow from courtroom to prison for drug
offenders, as the same drug addicted defendant routinely appeared in front of the same
prosecutors, judges, prison officials, and parole officers. For example, recidivism rates
increased from 322,000 in 1970 to more than 1.3 million in 1998 (Burke, 2010). Though
the war on drugs attacks the supply of illegal narcotics, drug courts focus on the demand
or the user (Burke, 2010). In November 1988, Herbert Klein, a circuit court judge in
Florida, noted continual placement of drug offenders on probation perpetuated the
problem, as the same offenders were seen repeatedly and would eventually be
incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses, which occupied space in prisons that violent
offenders could fill (Warren, 2009). Seeing this need, Judge Klein became a proponent
for drug courts; thus, the first drug court was implemented in Miami, Florida. After
Miami, drug courts expanded across the United States in areas like New York. Various
jurisdictions determined a need and tried to provide a court-related service to reduce drug
use, crime related to illegal drug use, and provide alternatives to incarceration. There
were more than 3,400 drug court programs in the United States by 2015 (“Drug Courts,”
2015). To date, there are no drug courts in the federal criminal justice system because
most federal drug cases relate to major drug trafficking organizations rather than users,
and drug courts are necessary to attack addiction not trafficking.
Drug courts can vary, especially when they number in the thousands. For
example, the Fifth Judicial District Drug Court located in Polk County, Iowa was
established in 1997 and operates as a diversionary program away from incarceration
supporting participants in treatment and rehabilitation (Annual Report, 2018). This
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program is called the “Intensive Supervision Court Program,” otherwise known as drug
court (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.). This 15-month program consists of a team comprised
of individuals from the judicial and community corrections system and treatment
providers including a judge, a probation supervisor, prosecutor, defense attorney,
probation officers, treatment counselors, and a secretary (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).
This program’s mission is “to promote public safety by facilitating positive changes in
the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of drug addicted offenders” (Fifth Judicial District,
n.d.). The program begins with an initial screening process before proceeding through
five phases, each with different goals, activities, and requirements that the participant
must complete before moving onto the next phase (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.). A
successful participant is one who completes all phases and is moved to the alumni
support group (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.).
Research associated with determining the effectiveness, impact, and costefficiency of drug courts is funded through the National Institute of Justice (“Drug
Courts,” 2015). Through National Institute of Justice funded research, drug courts have
resulted in a cost savings of $5,680 to $6,208 per offender despite higher treatment costs
(“Drug Courts,” 2015). However, these higher treatment costs affect the long-term
viability of drug courts. Budgets are often tied to results, and if a program is not
producing results, then it receives little to no funding or is cut altogether. For instance,
when only 20 drug court participants out of 100 do not recidivate, a state legislature may
not see the return on their investment when budgeting funds. But research supports the
benefits of specialty courts, focusing on the cost-benefit analysis of the programs in
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addition to the rehabilitative and reduction in recidivism benefits. For example, Marlow,
DeMatteo, and Festinger (2003) noted that there is a reduction in recidivism of up to 3
times greater than any other initiative. Further, considering financial and budgetary
crunches, Shepard (2010) argued that the justice system must find a solution for effective
penalties for crimes but be mindful of providing services within times of budgetary
shortfalls. The justice system must be innovative, especially when specialty courts such
as drug courts provide cost benefits and effectiveness (Shepard, 2010).
Although there is much discussion on the cost-benefit analysis of drug courts,
there is little discussion on whether the public supports it. Research has indicated that a
small majority believed treatment is better than incarceration; however, most individuals
have also believed that funding for incarceration is more important than treatment
(Giordano, 2014). Though there has been an increase in public support for treatment
rather than incarceration, there is still the question of whether political ideology
influences this support, especially if individuals know there was judicial oversight of
treatment such as through drug courts. Thus, this research was conducted to answer what
influence political ideology has over drug court support and whether drug courts
influence those who support incarceration.
Problem Statement
Drug courts are controversial because they go against the idea of court or the
criminal justice system. Typical criminal courts are adversarial, yet in drug court,
prosecutors and defense attorneys play a reduced or minimal role and in some
circumstances are not even present during proceedings (Nolan, 2003). Although this
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seems unconventional, defense attorneys and prosecutors appear to understand the need
for this specialty court. In addition, the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of
State Court Administrators endorsed the problem-solving court model, and the American
Bar Association also adopted a resolution in support of problem-solving courts (Nolan,
2003).
Despite understanding and support from stakeholders like judges and attorneys,
specialty courts have their critics as well, especially because of flaws in research
supporting them. Research has indicated a reduction in recidivism but with only cursory
statements of findings rather than evidence supported with methodology (Marlow et al.,
2003). Similar, research has suggested that those who participated in a drug court were
less likely to recidivate than nonparticipants (Mitchell, Wilson, Eggers, & MacKenzie,
2012); however, questions were raised as to whether recidivism increased once
participants completed drug court and no longer had oversight. In addition to these types
of flaws in research, critics have argued that drug courts are a testament to political
appeal not effectiveness, as they provide a cover for politicians (Hoffman, 2012).
Further, though drug courts are based on federal grants and use less court staff, they have
attempted to place as many individuals as possible into this specialty court, which
increases the number of drug cases and subsequent imprisonment rather than treatment
when defendants do not want to rehabilitate (Hoffman, 2012).
Regardless of the support or critique of drug courts, those offering their research
or opinion typically have some tie to the justice system. The little research from the
customer perspective has shown that attorneys believed that defendants got what they
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deserved (fair outcome), whereas the public felt that they received a case that was
handled fairly (fair procedure) as opposed to a fair outcome (Burke, 2010). There has
also been little research in the last 5 years as it relates to public support for treatment.
However, some research has suggested that respondents felt more comfortable supporting
treatment if there was court oversight (Giordano, 2015). Research continually shows
support for drug treatment, yet there are still those who believe in incarceration as the
best method. Thus, an analysis of the public’s support of drug court must be undertaken
to determine whether the public is aware of the specialty courts, whether they believe
there is fairness and justice within the specialty court, and their overall support of these
programs.
Purpose
This quantitative study was intended to explore whether political ideology affects
support for drug courts and if those who believe in incarceration as the best method
change their opinion when they are aware of the threat of incarceration through drug
court. Despite the reported benefits of specialty courts, there is limited research on the
overall effect of public’s support or lack thereof for these courts, especially considering
the current political climate within the United States (Giordano, 2014). For example, the
Trump Administration has led to an increase law enforcement’s resources related to
immigration and crime. The purpose of this study was to discover society’s support of
drug courts and how this may affect the courts’ future and viability, which may assist the
criminal justice system in determining whether drug courts will remain popular and
whether funding will continue. The dependent variable related to public opinion is
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support for drug courts and political party identification was the independent variable.
For judicial opinion, the dependent variable is support for drug courts, and the
independent variables are public influence, prior drug court experience, length of time as
a judge, opinion of treatment vs. incarceration, and appointed by a Democrat or
Republican governor.
Research Questions
Research Question 1: Does an individual’s political ideology influence their
support for funding of specialty drug courts?
H01: An individual’s political ideology does not influence their support for
funding of specialty drug courts.
H0a: An individual’s political ideology does influence their support for funding
of specialty drug courts.
H02: An individual who previously supported incarceration will not support drug
court when knowing there is judicial oversight.
H0a: An individual who previously supported incarceration will support drug
court when knowing there is judicial oversight.
Research Question 2: Are judges affected by public views sentencing a defendant
to drug court?
Research Question 3: Are judges affected by the gubernatorial policies of the
administration who appointed the judge to the bench?
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework relative to this study is power and politics. Power and
politics relate to the various players within the criminal justice system who can support
the continued funding of drug courts (Shafritz et al, 2016). Power has the capability to
effect or influence change (French & Raven, 1959). Change can be thoughts, opinions,
ideas, values and behavior (French & Raven, 1959). More power is related to having a
strong base of power, meaning the stronger the base power, the greater the power (French
& Raven, 1959). Power and politics rejects the normal assumptions from the classical or
neoclassical theories, which assumes that people in positions of authority set goals and
the purpose of the organization is to achieve the set goals (Shafritz et al, 2016). This
suggests that legislators would set the goals in the best interests of the public, including
funding. Classical theory also focuses on how best to create and manage the organization
to achieve the goals effectively and efficiently (Shafritz et al., 2016), but the government
is not always efficient.
When looking at power and politics theory, organizations are viewed as a
complex compilation of individuals and coalitions. For example, there are influencers
who seek to control the organization by using their means or influence (Shafritz, et al,
2016). These influencers could also be society, the individuals, who collectively elect an
individual to represent their interests. On the other hand, society, collectively can vote to
unseat an individual who they feel do not represent their interests.
Shafritz, et al., (2016) argues power accomplishes established goals and people in
positions of authority set these goals (Shafritz, et al, 2016). Yet the people in “power”
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are elected to the position by the electorate, thus who maintains power and control? An
elected official has control of a resource (i.e. funding), but the electorate maintains the
power of the ballot. Understanding that more people support treatment over incarceration
yet support funding for incarceration, the people have the power to influence and direct
the government toward what they feel is necessary. What the government spends its
money in can be directly attributable to the power given to the people, if they exercise it.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was a quantitative, nonexperimental research design
assessing for causal relationships. Causal relationships develop when one variable causes
another to change or exist (O’Sullivan et. al, 2017). For example, at the most basic level,
the research analyzed society’s support and its effects on drug courts. For analyzing the
public’s view, the dependent variable is support for drug court for both public and
judicial surveys, and the independent variable included political party identification. In
addition to determining the public’s views, data were also collected from judges. The
dependent variable is support for drug court and the independent variables include prior
drug court experience, length of time as a judge, preference of treatment vs. incarceration
and the gubernatorial political party which appointed the judge.
Surveys for both the public and judges were developed by the researcher. The
population sample for judges is all district court judges for the Midwestern state. The
population sample for the public came from registered voters in a judicial district in the
Midwestern state, which consists of 11 counties. The judicial survey was administered
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via online survey. The public survey was mailed to 1,000 randomly chosen registered
voters. Data were collected and analyzed with logistic regression analysis.
Definitions
Drug court: Although there are various methods of drug courts operations, drug
courts for the purpose of this study are a treatment program overseen by the courts with a
potential or threat of incarceration.
Political party identity: This is the independent variable for Research Question 1
and was determined by the political party the participant self-reports they are registered.
The political parties available for respondents are Democrat or Republican. According to
this Midwestern state’s auditor, these are the only two recognized political parties.
Assumptions
For this study, it was assumed that drug courts generally operated in the same
manner, with participants entering a court supervised drug treatment program with threat
of punishment/incarceration. It was also assumed that survey participants had a general
knowledge of illegal drug abuse issues and that there was some form of treatment
available. Finally, it was assumed that district court judges felt safe in expressing or
providing data based on the confidentiality and anonymity provided. It was therefore
assumed that judges were honest and truthful in providing answers related to drug court
sentencing and public influence. It was also assumed those who are registered to vote
also exercise their right to vote by participating in elections, including local and state
elections.
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Scope and Delimitations
This study limited the sample in two different methods. First, this study was
limited to a Midwestern State. Though illegal drug abuse is a national epidemic, certain
areas of the United States experience different choices of illegal drugs. This study was
focused on a Midwestern state where the manufacture of methamphetamine plagued the
State, resulting in implementing various law criminalizing such actions as buying
pseudoephedrine. On the other hand, Southwestern states may experience
methamphetamine as an imported illegal drug from Mexico. Second, this study limited
the sample to participants who were registered voters, and individuals who are not
registered to vote were not considered.
Limitations
At the time of this study, the United States is in the middle of President Donald
Trump’s first administration and the 2020 Presidential election campaigns began for both
political parties. The United States previously had 8 years of Democratic President Barak
Obama. However, this study did not track or determine whether the change in
presidential administration affected political party ideology and what effect political
rhetoric may have had on voters’ views of drug court. The limitation was strictly to
political party and not whether there was effect by presidential administration or rhetoric.
Another limitation of this study is that not every individual who is registered to
vote exercises their right to do so. Potential participant bias may also be whether
individuals have been victimized by an individual under the influence of illegal drugs.
Finally, the structure of drug courts varies widely across the country, so generalizability
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of the findings to organizations within alternative operating structures was not possible.
Although overall generalizability of drug courts may be valid, participants’ experiences
cannot be generalized.
Significance
Resources are given, cut, or eliminated by executive and legislative branches of
government during the budgeting process, yet obtaining funding is necessary for the
judicial branch to continue to function properly. Considering recidivism and the
increasing numbers of defendants, especially drug offenders, financial resources are
necessary to reduce costs for law enforcement, corrections, and ultimately society.
However, despite the requests for funding from the judicial branch, funding is not
increased, and in many cases, funding is cut or substantially reduced. Each legislator is
influenced to his or her respective electorate and districts, which creates a problem in
determining legislative funding priorities that are also reflective of the priorities of voters.
Decisions are based on constituent’s reactions and support, which may change over time.
For example, under the Obama Administration, many nonviolent drug offenders’
sentences were commuted; however, under the Trump Administration more vigilant
efforts are made to increase law enforcement’s resources, specifically immigration and
crime (Horwitz, 2017; Mitchell, 2018). Further, legislators will approve funding for what
they may see as a better return on their investment, which can be difficult to justify for
drug addicted criminals. But if funding is not provided to drug courts, this courtsupervised treatment option could be eliminated.
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Drug court research has focused on recidivism and cost-benefit analysis; however,
there is little research on societal views and whether this has ramifications on funding.
The purpose of this quantitative study was to discover society’s support or nonsupport of
drug court and understand how this may affect the long-term viability of drug court. This
information will assist the criminal justice system in determining whether drug courts
will remain popular and whether funding will continue. Society and judges supporting
drug courts has significance for implementing and/or maintaining drug courts in the
Midwestern state in this study. If there is overall support for drug courts, as opposed to
incarceration, elected officials must take notice of their electorates’ desires for how their
taxes should be spent.
Summary
Illegal drug use is a problem within the United States. The government has
addressed this problem through incarceration; however, realizing that incarceration is not
fixing or addressing the problem, treatment has garnered more support. But even with
more support for treatment, there are opponents of drug court. This study addressed
whether political ideology predicts support for drug courts as well as whether support can
increase with knowledge of a drug court being supervised with the threat of incarceration.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Previously, public sentiment has been focused on incarcerating individuals over
treatment, but public support for treatment is increasing and so is treatment policy and
funding. One method of treatment, with judicial oversight, emerged in the 1990s in the
form of drug courts. The idea behind drug court was to provide an alternative to
incarceration but also provide cost-saving measures while reducing recidivism (Mitchell,
2011). Subsequent research has indicated that there is some benefit to drug courts, with
cost-savings and a reduction in recidivism (2018 Annual Report, n.d.; Department of
Corrections, n.d.; Katsiyannis et al., 2018); however, not everyone believes drug courts
are successful or worthwhile. Prior research focused on whether the public supported
treatment over incarceration; however, there is little research that indicates if there is
support for drug courts. Further, there is little research that indicates whether individuals
who previously supported incarceration might change their view if they were aware of
judicial oversight drug courts. This research was conducted to answer these questions.
Drug Court
For some, drug court is innovative and has the potential for social change by
providing rehabilitation and treatment in lieu of incarceration. But for others, drug
offenders were not punished or punished enough for committing crimes. This may be
because the public may not fully understand drug courts other than they keep drug users
out of prison or avoids punishment.
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Drug court is an alternative to incarceration by diverting drug offenders to
treatment as opposed to prison, combining community-based treatment with court
oversight (Rempel et al., 2012). There are many components to a drug court program and
while each court may vary, it follows a predictive pattern in its organization. Depending
on the drug court, a participant can enter the program pre-plea or post-plea (Mitchell,
2011). Generally, after arrest, a drug-offender is screened to determine eligibility, and if
they are, charges will be reduced or possibly dismissed (although dismissal is unlikely;
Mitchell, 2011). Once in drug court, the participant appears before the drug court judge
and must comply with the court’s requirements, including urinalysis, attending treatment,
and appearing at status conferences (Mitchell, 2011). Appearance at status hearings is
most vital as this is where the drug court judge, in addition to others, collaborate
(Mitchell, 2011). Depending on the drug court, the participant will move through three
or more phases before successfully completing the program, which can vary in time from
a year to 2-and-a-half years (Mitchell, 2011). Most do not successfully complete the
program, and successful graduation is just under 50% (Mitchell, 2011). Those who are
unsuccessful typically are charged with new crimes, relapse, fail to attend treatment
and/or drug court hearings, or simply leave the program (Mitchell, 2011).
One example of a drug court is the Fifth Judicial District Drug Court Program in
Des Moines, Iowa, otherwise known as Polk County Drug Court, which has been in
existence for over 20 years (2018 Annual Report, n.d.). The Polk County Drug Court
accepts participants who are drug using and have been sentenced to this program. The
goal is to supervise, drug test, and provide treatment to nonviolent drug offenders, along
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with incentives and sanctions that may result in incarceration (2018 Annual Report, n.d.).
Participants are non-violent drug offenders who are diverted from the criminal justice
system, with the threat of sanctions, which may result in incarceration (2018 Annual
Report, n.d.). Drug dealers and those with assaultive or violent offenses are precluded
from the program (2018 Annual Report, n.d.). The process for the Polk County Drug
Court is as follows: An individual may be referred to the program by the county
attorney’s office, attorneys, Department of Corrections, family and friends, and other
drug court participants. Each referred and potential participant is screened thoroughly by
reviewing prior criminal history, police reports, community corrections history and any
other relevant information, which is then followed by an in-person interview where
behaviors are also analyzed. A treatment evaluation follows to determine the level of
care needed and after this rigorous process a determination of whether the individual is
accepted into the program is made (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.). Once an individual is
ordered into drug court by the drug court judge, the participant will travel through five
different phases: Phase 1: Stabilization; Phase 2: Recovery; Phase 3: Abstinence; Phase
4: Pre-Release; and Phase 5: Support. As the drug court participant moves through the
phases, requirements become less as the participant gains more control over their
addiction; however, sanctions are also imposed for rule violations on a gradual and
sliding scale (Fifth Judicial District, n.d.). Once a person successfully completes Phase 5,
they graduate and move to the alumni group.
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Cost Benefit/Effectiveness
As evidenced by the Fifth Judicial District Department of Corrections, cost
benefits do exist to drug courts. The Fifth Judicial District Corrections reported an
average cost of $15.39/day for each participant (2018 Annual Report, n.d.) compared to
the Iowa Department of Corrections average cost to incarcerate an individual of $90.03
(Department of Corrections, n.d.). However, the effectiveness of drug courts is based on
an individual’s perspective. For instance, there is a dichotomy between
treatment/rehabilitation and courts. Combining treatment for a disease and the penal
system is at odds with the goals of each. For example, those who support treatment
believe that there has been a war waged against drug addicts, with governmental funding
supporting crime control not rehabilitation (Walsh, 2011). Further, traditionally the
justice system is predicated on conflict, where the prosecution fights for conviction and
the defense fights for the defendant. But in drug courts, the prosecutor and defense
attorney work alongside treatment providers and a drug court judge.
Governmental budgets provide an indication of policy agendas and goals
regarding the cost benefit and effectiveness of drug courts. In May 2017, the White
House released the national drug control budget, providing highlights of 2018’s fiscal
year budget (ONDCP, 2017). Drug prevention and treatment, including drug courts, is
included in the budget of $99.9 million set aside for drug courts (ONDCP, 2017). The
money supports prevention, treatment, interdiction, international operations and law
enforcement, with a focus on opioid addiction. Figure 1 shows the increase from 2016 to
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2018 in treatment and a slight dip in law enforcement (ONDCP, 2017). Additionally,
interdiction received a slight increase, whereas prevention was reduced (ONDCP, 2017).

Figure 1. Federal drug resources by function. From ONDCP (2017).
Further, Health and Human Services received $59.9 million, and the Department of
Justice received $40 million to work together to enhance court services, coordination, and
substance abuse treatment for adult and juvenile drug courts (ONDCP, 2017). Funding
for treatment has increased incrementally since 2016, whereas law enforcement has
remained relatively unchanged (ONDCP, 2017). Based on this funding, the federal
government appears to see the benefit of drug courts and the goal to reduce recidivism,
provide treatment to those addicted, and improve the chances of rehabilitation with
“early, continuous, and intense judicially supervised treatment, mandatory periodic drug
testing, community supervision, appropriate sanctions and other rehabilitation services”
(ONDCP, 2017, p. 11). This funding also acknowledges the opioid crisis within the
United States, which has become a priority (ONDCP, 2019).
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One reason why drug courts are popular is the availability of federal funding,
which is a testament to their viability. Though drug courts can get their funding from
private or local entities, the largest segment of funding comes from the Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and Bureau of Justice Assistance. There have been a
variety of drug court funding from grants; however, the grant solicitation in 2016 was the
Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program. These grants are helpful for
implementation of a new drug court program but also enhancement for an already
existing program (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2016). For either category, the
maximum funding is $500,000. There are also significant requirements, including
evidence-based practices supported by the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals and a financial match whether “in-kind or cash” (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2016). Federal funds awarded under the this grant also cannot cover more
than 75% of the program’s total costs, and the applicants must disclose who and how the
remaining 25% will be funded and how it will match funds (Bureau of Justice Assistance,
2016). Thus, local and state governments must determine if they can provide the
remaining funding and whether they want to.
Although research has supported the economic benefit of drug courts, there are
questions about whether the results justify funding these programs. In 1998, there were
1,262,546 drug arrests within the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.).
The United States reached an all-time high of drug arrests in 2006 and 2007 with roughly
1,420,000 in each year (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.). There was a consistent
reduction in drug arrests since 2007; however, the United States saw an uptick in 2016,
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with a jump to 1,285,186 (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.). With arrests comes
convictions and incarceration, which significantly increased the prison population and
culminated in many initiatives. The most recent was President Trump signing the First
Step Act in December 2018 (Drug Policy Alliance, 2018), which reduced drug sentences
for certain offenders within the federal system. These initiatives address the prison
population after offenders (i.e. drug addicts) have been sentenced and most likely spent
many years behind bars. Drug courts emerged as another method to prevent prison
overpopulation, but drug courts are not without their own problems.
One argument against drug courts is that probation, otherwise known as
community corrections, does not address the addiction of clients. Some argue that drug
courts do what probation offices did or could do with resources and are limited in their
options for treatment (Walsh, 2011). Though research on a multi-site evaluation of adult
drug courts over a period of 5 years showed positive effects of drug court, there was also
room for improvement. For example, by enlarging the potential population, drug courts
can also include high-risk offenders, who may not be included even though they need
treatment because of the chances of them relapsing or recidivating, which affects positive
statistics (Rempel et al, 2012). Additionally, for a drug court and judicial oversight to be
effective, a judge must focus their time and efforts on those who need extra attention,
though this takes this judge away from regular duties and places additional burden and
cost on other judges (Rempel et al., 2012).
Another argument against drug courts is that the threat of sanctions is the only
thing that ensures the effectiveness of this problem-solving court. Walsh (2011) argued
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that front end treatment, pre-arrest, is just as effective, and the need for threat of sanctions
was unwarranted. Walsh also argued that research from Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services indicates there is little to no difference between the success of a drug
addict referred through the criminal justice system as opposed through other means. In
most circumstances, drug court requires a crime to be committed to take advantage of the
program, which is also counterintuitive to assisting those who need drug treatment. The
Drug Policy Alliance (2011) has also argued that drug courts have not improved public
safety because drug court participants must commit a crime to receive the alleged
benefits. Further, there are arguments of little cost savings and not reducing the prison
population (Drug Policy Alliance, 2011).
Despite arguments against drug courts, for proponents, drug courts have a
successful impact on the lives of the addicted. The most important goal is the reduction
in recidivism. Katsiyannis, Whitford, Zhang and Gage (2018) conducted a meta-analysis
of recidivism studies from 1994-2015 and noted that within 5 years of release in 2005,
77% of offenders were rearrested and of those, 29% were arrested for a violent crime
(Durose et al., 2015; Katsiyannis et al., 2018). The main predictor for recidivism of
general offenders was substance abuse, which was a strong predictor for sexual offenders
and second predictor for violent offenders (Katsiyannis et al, 2018). Therefore, effective
treatment strategies must be implemented for offenders to address their controllable
predictor, substance abuse (Katsiyannis, et al, 2018). Katsiyannis, et al. (2018) noted
there are static predictors, consisting of traits such as age, gender, race, among others;
and dynamic predictors, which are factors which can change, such as criminogenic needs.
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While this study did not relate to drug courts, it does present an argument of the affect
substance abuse does have on an offender.
Though drug courts are intended to reduce recidivism, the other argument for
implementation is to provide an alternative to incarceration and reduce the burden on
correctional services. A meta-analysis focusing on whether this burden on corrections is
alleviated by drug court provided mixed results. Sevigny, Fuleihan and Ferdik (2013)
studied the effectiveness of drug courts as an alternative to incarceration and found that
drug courts were positive in reducing incarceration compared to other community-based
correction interventions. They estimated that drug courts reduced the incarceration rate
from a base rate of 50% to 42% for jail, 38% for prison, and 32% overall incarceration
(Sevigny et al., 2013). But they also found that drug court participants did not spend any
less time incarcerated, which may be due to drug courts using an increase in sanctions for
program violations or incarceration for those who fail the program (Sevigny et al., 2013).
Despite a potential benefit of reducing recidivism, research shows the impact on
the corrections system may not be realized with drug court. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has from 1997 until 2011 collected data and analyzed the
effectiveness of drug courts. In 1997, the GAO reported from their survey at the end of
1996 that 48% of drug court participants successfully completed the program (GAO,
1997, p. 56). But the GAO also stated it could not provide conclusions as to
effectiveness and recidivism (GAO, 1997). Most of the reason for the inability to provide
a conclusion was due to limitations in the evaluations, such as failing to analyze
outcomes other than program participation and using any comparison data (GAO, 1997).
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However, even when it was difficult to see where the benefits were recognized, the
number of drug courts increased. In 1997, the GAO reported 42 drug courts began
between 1989 and 1994 (GAO, 1997). Since 1994, four drug courts closed and 123 new
drug courts were implemented for a total of 161 drug courts in operation by April 1997
(GAO, 1991). By 2011, when it appears the GAO conducted the last study regarding
effectiveness of drug courts, the GAO reported as of June 2010, there were more than
2500 drug courts nationwide (GAO, 2011). Of the 2,500 drug courts, 1,400 of those
courts were adult drug courts (GAO, 2011).
Federal grant funds were provided for drug courts, and to study the effect of drug
court, the Department of Justice required grantees to provide performance measurement
data (GAO, 2011). In 2005, the GAO used comparison groups and concluded evidence
showed a reduction in recidivism for drug court participants during the time they were
involved in the program and receiving treatment (GAO, 2005). There were questionable
results for recidivism for the time period after a person completed drug court
programming (GAO, 2005). By 2011, more robust data allowed better conclusions. The
GAO reported lower recidivism for those who had participated in a drug court program
(GAO, 2011).
Effectiveness of reducing recidivism was also supported by a meta-analytic
analysis of 154 evaluations, consisting of 92 evaluations of adult drug courts, 34 juvenile
drug courts, and 28 DWI courts (Mitchell, Wilson, Eggers, & MacKenzie, 2012).
Effectiveness depended on the type of drug court. Mitchell, et al, (2012) found drug
court participants recidivate at a lesser rate than non-participants and adult drug courts

24
were effective in reducing recidivism. Questions were raised as to whether participants
continued to follow treatment methods after completion of the drug court program. Some
claimed participants were successful during drug court, due to the rigorous oversight
while within the program and treatment. Mitchell, et al. (2012) found positive results of
reduced recidivism not only during drug court, but also after drug courts, up to three
years after drug court.
Even with these reported benefits, the Trump Administration prioritized treatment
and prevention, but also heard the former Attorney General Jeff Sessions state general
recidivism rates were “unacceptably high” (TCR Staff, 2018). The Trump
Administration tasked the director of the National Institute of Justice to address and
reduce these high numbers (TCR Staff, 2018). Even with presidential administration
financial support, and the reported benefits, cost-effectiveness, and support from the
criminal justice system, there is little research on whether the public support tax dollars
spent on drug court.
Prior research has shown a shift in thinking as it relates to treatment versus
punishment. In 2006, the General Social Survey asked two relevant questions to this
research. First, the respondents were asked if the government was spending too much,
too little, or about the right amount of money when dealing with drug addiction. The
second question asked if the government was spending too much, too little or about the
right amount of money on drug rehabilitation (Smith, Davern, Freese, & Morgan, 2019).
The same questions were asked in 2016 (Smith et al., 2019).
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Table 1
Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2006

Valid

Frequency
906

Percent
20.1

Valid Percent
63.4

Cumulative
Percent
63.4

ABOUT RIGHT

401

8.9

28.1

91.5

TOO MUCH

121

2.7

8.5

100.0

Total

1428

31.7

100.0

IAP

3026

67.1

DK

54

1.2

NA

2

.0

3082

68.3

4510

100.0

TOO LITTLE

Missing

Total
Total

Table 2
Dealing with Drug Addiction in 2016

Valid

TOO LITTLE
ABOUT RIGHT
TOO MUCH

Missing

Percent
32.0

Valid Percent
65.8

Cumulative
Percent
65.8

367

12.8

26.3

92.1
100.0

110

3.8

7.9

Total

1395

48.7

100.0

IAP

1430

49.9

DK

40

1.4

NA

2

.1

1472

51.3

2867

100.0

Total
Total

Frequency
918

In a decade, respondents reported believing the government was doing too little in
dealing with drug addiction, while there was also a small increase in the belief the
government was doing too much. When it comes to drug rehabilitation, there was an
increase in respondents who believed the government was not doing enough for drug
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rehabilitation, but there was also an increase in those who believed the government was
spending “about right” and “too much.”
Table 3
Drug Rehabilitation in 2006

Valid

Frequency
777

Percent
17.2

Valid Percent
55.7

Cumulative
Percent
55.7

ABOUT RIGHT

463

10.3

33.2

88.9

TOO MUCH

155

3.4

11.1

100.0

Total

1395

30.9

100.0

IAP

3002

66.6

TOO LITTLE

Missing

DK
Total
Total

113

2.5

3115

69.1

4510

100.0

Table 4
Drug Rehabilitation in 2016

Valid

Missing

Frequency
850

Percent
29.6

Valid Percent
62.6

Cumulative
Percent
62.6

ABOUT RIGHT

357

12.5

26.3

88.9

TOO MUCH

151

5.3

11.1

100.0

Total

1358

47.4

100.0

IAP

1437

50.1

DK

70

2.4

NA

2

.1

1509

52.6

2867

100.0

TOO LITTLE

Total
Total

Note. from Smith et al. (2019).
In a ten-year span, respondents continued to believe the government was not
doing enough dealing with drug addiction. When asked if the government was doing
enough with drug rehabilitation, the number of respondents who believe the government
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spends too much remained the same, but there was an increase in those who believed
there was too little government action.
Pew Research Center (2014) noted about a third of Americans believe drug abuse
is a crisis and 55% see drug abuse as a serious problem. Even with many Americans
viewing drug abuse as a significant problem, 63% report agreement with states dropping
mandatory drug sentences compared to 32% (Pew Research Center, 2014). Older
Americans and Republicans are more likely to have concerns about dropping mandatory
drug offenses, 49% of Republicans were positive toward eliminating mandatory drug
sentences compared to 41% in 2001 (Pew Research Center, 2014). Democrats were
supportive of this drug policy change with 66% in 2014 compared to 48% in 2001 (Pew
Research Center, 2014). When asked whether the government should focus on treatment
as opposed to prosecuting illegal drug users, the consensus was to provide treatment with
67%, compared to just 26% supportive of prosecution (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Similar to elimination of mandatory drug sentences, Democrats (77%) and Independents
(69%) wanted government policy to reflect treatment, compared to 51% of Republicans
(Pew Research Center, 2014).
Public Opinion Influences Criminal Justice Policy
Meithe, Lu, and Reese (2000) discuss the reintegrative shaming of drug court
participants as social control to promote conformity over deviance. It is the power of
society which controls an individual’s behavior; thus, drug court participants want to be
part of society, not stigmatized. It is the power of society which makes the individual
conform to society’s standards. The very same idea or concept of power can be
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applicable when seeking public support for drug courts utilizing the same method used
for drug court participants to conform their behavior to society’s standards.
Power has the capability to effect change or influence one or more in their thought
process. French and Raven (1959) define power as influence or influencing
psychological change. Change can be thoughts, opinions, ideas, values and behavior
(French & Raven, 1959). French and Raven (1959) identify five types of power: referent,
expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate power. They note more power is related to
having a strong base of power, meaning the stronger the base power, the greater the
power one has (French & Raven, 1959). This concept of power is applicable when
looking at governmental resources.
Government resources are controlled and funded by executive and legislative
branches of government. Obtaining funding is necessary for the judicial branch to
continue to function properly. Considering recidivism and the increasing numbers of
defendants, especially drug offenders, injecting financial resources into an area which
could reduce costs for law enforcement, corrections, and ultimately society.
Legislative funding is a method to ensure drug courts receive appropriate and
proper funding. When determining funding, power becomes quite relevant in the
legislative body and the public. Power is a word that has a variety of definitions. Dahl
(1957) proposed a definition of power as a relation among people. It is a power relation
or that someone has “power” over another (Dahl, 1957). Dahl (1957) also suggests there
is more, such as the source of power, the means to exert influence, the extent of power
and the scope of power. At the most basic level, legislators have the power of the purse
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strings over society. However, each legislator is beholden to their respective electorate
and districts who hold power over their elected official. With this power over an elected
official, the power of the ballot can influence the elected official.
The power of the ballot can influence legislative bodies to determine legislative
funding priorities. As a legislator answers to one’s electorate, their priorities are also
reflective of the priorities of voters. Legislators can be influenced and fund initiatives
they see as a better return on their investment, such as choosing funding between
education and treatment for drug addicted criminals. The voters have the influence over
legislative priorities, which can include new initiatives for the court system.
In November 2016, a survey of 1000 registered voters, followed by 30 interviews,
concluded people believe the court system is unique, but need to adapt to new
technologies to meet the needs of their customers (Gerstein, Bocian, Agne [GBA]
Strategies, 2016). Innovative sentencing options and other methods to reduce the flow of
defendants through the justice system would reflect this thought. They also found voters
are generally uneducated, misinformed, or misunderstand funding for the courts (GBA
Strategies, 2016). Ultimately GBS Strategies (2016) found most voters do not know or
understand how tax dollars are spent. This is a troubling concept in that taxpayers and
voters are not aware of how their money is being spent and ultimately do not understand
or even overestimate where funds are being spent (GBA Strategies, 2016). This would
include the areas of being innovative, such as drug courts.
Most drug court programs are left to obtain funding from federal grant programs,
which are also limited with funds diverted to other areas, including law enforcement and
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crime control. It becomes a fight over the small pool of money. When federal grant
funds are obtained, it is not a guarantee funding will continue, nor a guarantee it will
cover all costs related to the drug court. Many grants implement a requirement of
matching funds, requiring state and local governments to fund drug court as well. The
grant funds are also not guaranteed from year to year.
Public opinion affects policy about three quarters of the time when the impact is
gauged (Burstein, 2003). When an issue is determined to be “important” or “salient,”
public opinion appears to have great influence. (Burstein, 2003). Thus, public opinion
can influence drug court funding if it is determined to be salient. Little has been studied
and published about critical topics of public opinion and public policy, especially as it
relates to drug courts as an alternative to incarceration. Yet, when the public, privately or
in public, argue their voice or vote does not mean anything, this seems to be untrue.
Evidence suggests the more important, or salient, an issue, the more government listens
and the more policy is affected. There is little evidence government responsiveness has
declined when there is public opinion and support (Burstein, 2003). The argument the
government does not listen is far from the truth. The public holds more power than it
believes, and the government tends to be more responsive to public opinion than what the
public believes.
One of the most compelling research projects on public opinion on drug treatment
or incarceration was based out of Pinellas County, Florida. Giordano (2014) wanted to
discover how open the public is to reform on the War on Drugs and whether they support
treatment or incarceration. Because Miami, Florida created the first Drug Court,
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Giordano’s study was interesting to see whether there was more support for treatment or
incarceration. Giordano (2014) found there was very little research in this area, noting
there have been several small opinion polls suggesting drug treatment is best. Opinion
polls can be questionable especially when the results varied between support for the War
on Drug and drug treatment (Giordano, 2014).
In his study, Giordano (2014) assessed the public’s views on drug treatment rather
than incarceration and whether that answer was influenced by the individual’s view of
drug addiction. He utilized the Maryland Voter Survey and other questions he developed
(Giordano, 2014). Giordano (2014) found slightly over half of the respondents (51.1%)
believe drug treatment was better than incarceration, however, this appears to be
significantly affected by the respondents view of whether addiction was a choice or a
disease. 51.7% of respondents found addiction was a choice, as opposed to 31% seeing
addiction as a disease (Giordano, 2014). Those who see addiction as a disease,
overwhelmingly viewed treatment, as opposed to incarceration, as the appropriate method
(Giordano, 2014). Yet even with the support toward treatment to combat drug addiction,
Giordano (2014) also found more respondents supported a reduction in funding for
treatment as opposed to money spent on incarceration. Giordano (2014) acknowledges
this is interesting and “implausible” especially when there was more support for
treatment when the respondent knew the courts were supervising drug offenders in
treatment.
There is a “definite deficit in research of this subject” especially considering the
support for treatment, yet reduction in support for funding (Giordano, 2014). Little
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research has been completed as it relates to the debate on the War on Drugs and the
treatment vs. incarceration dilemma. In fact, in the last decade and a half, there has been
little research on the War on Drugs and public opinion. This is surprising considering the
severe uptick in opioid abuse and overdose deaths. While the Trump Administration has
acknowledged the opioid crisis and provided funding toward reduction for this drug
abuse, there appears to be little research recently on drug courts, public opinion or the
War on Drugs.
Summary
Research shows the American public no longer believes the War on Drugs is
effective and they want change. The public also wants the government to do
“something” about the drug problem. Previously, the consensus was to send drug
offenders to prison. Incarceration was the predominant theme; however, this has changed
when the public realized prison populations were continually increasing. The illegal drug
problem was not affected by incarceration. The public’s views changed to a softer and
kinder viewpoint---treatment. While treatment was gaining ground, not everyone was
convinced drug abusers should avoid prison; however, treatment and treatment options
gained ground.
Problem-solving courts, and in this specific instance, drug courts entered the
picture in the 1990’s in light of the increase in drug deaths, violence and crime. Drug
courts opened across the country in search of a way to decrease the prison population and
most importantly, reduce recidivism. In addition to those goals, one of the most vital was
cost savings. Drug courts claimed to save taxpayer money and, in most circumstances, it
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was less expensive to place a drug offender in drug court as opposed to prison. In some
instances, recidivism rates were less for those who entered drug court. There was a sign
of cost-benefits for drug courts.
Prior research focused almost exclusively on treatment in general. Drug courts
pose an interesting conundrum. While drug court is treatment, it is also court or judicial
supervised with the threat of incarceration for rules violations or failing the program. It is
not a “get out of jail free” card. Some studies have shown drug court participants might
serve more time behind bars than if sent to prison originally.
What support will the public have in a Midwestern state where methamphetamine
was a significant problem, as compared to the State where the first drug court was
incorporated and suffered through severe cocaine wars, for drug treatment as opposed to
incarceration if there is judicial oversight through drug court? The question then
becomes what if the policy combines treatment and punishment? Will judicial oversight
of treatment via drug courts convert those who believe in incarceration? The next
question will be, if there is public support for drug courts and judicial oversight, will
judges support drug courts and sentence individuals to this form of judicial oversight
treatment?
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
Despite the reported benefits of specialty courts, there is limited research on the
public support for these courts, especially considering the current political climate within
the United States. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine whether political
ideology affects support for drug courts and if those who believe in incarceration as the
best method change their opinion when they are aware of the threat of incarceration
through drug court. This chapter covers information on the design and methodology of
the study.
Research Design and Rationale
The nature of this study is quantitative to predict whether the dependent variable
was affected by the independent variables. Thus, this study sought to predict whether a
person’s political party identification indicated whether they support drug courts.
Further, this study sought to predict whether judges are in support of drug courts based on
public influence and gubernatorial political affiliation. The quantitative research design
was nonexperimental, as it attempted to predict or correlate the relationship of the
independent and dependent variables. The variables were analyzed for their correlation
or predication, but the independent variables were not manipulated in any way.
In this research, the dependent variable in each of the three research questions is
support for drug courts. For Research Question 1, the independent variable is political
party identification. In Research Question 2, the independent variables are length as a
district court judge, prior drug court experience, and preference of treatment vs.
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incarceration. In Research Question 3, the independent variable is changed to reflect the
political party of the governor who appointed the judge.
Data were collected from judges and the public. For Research Questions 2 and 3,
district court judges were studied because they consider a variety of factors in
determining the appropriate sentence of a defendant. Judges assess a defendant’s ability
to maintain oneself within the community in addition to age, prior history, and the
seriousness of the crime. Public support is technically not an appropriate consideration,
but this research sought to determine whether public support for a program factors into a
judge’s thought process. This second portion of this study seeks to determine the
influence of public opinion and the amount of this influence over a judge when
determining sentencing options for a defendant. A quantitative design was chosen to
maintain confidentiality of answers and provide the most reliability of responses.
Although there is a smaller number of judges in this Midwestern state, indicating that a
qualitative design would be best, this researcher was concerned with judges providing
full answers with concerns of confidentiality.
Methodology
First, descriptive statistics were analyzed for frequency and percentages of the
variables. This provides an overall general view of the sample to review for balance
among political party, race, and ethnicity. Logistic regression statistical analysis was
chosen to answer the research questions. The dependent variable is dichotomous, and the
independent variables reflect categorical and continuous variables. Because there are
multiple independent variables, logistic regression is the most appropriate statistical
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analysis. There were several statistical analyses that were considered but were
determined not appropriate. Analysis of variance and multivariate analysis of variance
both require the dependent variable to be measured on a continuous level, so they were
not appropriate for this research project, as the dependent variable reflected support or no
support for drug court. Based on statistical assumptions, logistic regression statistical test
provides the most appropriate statistical analysis.
Population
The population for Research Question 1 consists of adults residing in one judicial
district which comprises 11 counties in a Midwestern state. The adults ranged from 18
years of age to higher and registered to vote. This judicial district was chosen because it
has a reactivated drug court operating in only one of the 11 counties. The population for
Research Questions 2 and 3 consist of all district court judges within the Midwestern
state.
Sampling and Sampling Procedure
To ensure the registered voter sample size was sufficient to minimize any error of
measurement, G-Power analysis was used to determine the sample pool of registered
voters. Based on the statistical testing of a two-tail logistic regression analysis with a
Type-I error rate (alpha) being .05, the sample size for statistical significance was N =
104. A two-tailed test provides a positive or negative deviation from the hypothesized
value can be determined to be significant. For the best chance to obtain 104 responses,
1,000 surveys were mailed to registered voters. Obtaining more than 104 would ensure
greater power and statistical significance, while reducing the probability of measurement

37
error. The sample was drawn from a random sample of 238,000 adult registered voters
from within the 11 counties of the judicial district.
In this Midwestern state, there are several levels of judges: magistrates, associate
district court, district court, senior judges, and appellate courts. District court judges
have general jurisdiction and eligible to be assigned to drug court. Of the eight judicial
districts in this Midwestern state, at the time of this study, there are 116 district court
judges. All district court judges were surveyed with the support of the state court
administrator.
There was a concern about the racial make-up of the judicial district, which may
not provide representation across all races. There are several rural communities, with
little diversity; however, the rural communities appear to be balanced with the larger
metropolitan areas located within the judicial district. There may also be concern about
racial and gender make-up of the judicial branch, but district court judges were not asked
about demographics because they are held to a higher standard and should not allow
demographics to interfere with their judicial decisions.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation and Data Collection
Registered voter data were obtained from the secretary of state’s office for the
Midwestern state and was limited to the 11 counties in the judicial district. For general
public opinion, a paper survey was mailed to registered voters asking their opinions and
thoughts about drug courts along with demographic information pertaining to race,
gender, and political party. The survey was mailed with an introduction and consent
letter explaining the purpose and process of this study and participants’ involvement
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rights. This explained the research purpose to determine the public’s opinion related to
drug court versus incarceration and judicial involvement through drug courts in their
judicial district. This letter also noted that the research was not politically motivated or
tied to any political agenda. Participants will be provided a copy of the finalized study.
Participant confidentiality was also addressed by instructing the participant to not
include any identification markers on the survey, including their name, address, or phone
number. However, to track those who participated in the survey, a number was assigned
to each survey that corresponded to a master list of names. This prevented repeated
mailers from requesting their participation in the study. The list of names was
maintained on the researcher’s password-protected computer that only this researcher will
have access. All paper copies of the letter and survey will be locked in a cabinet for 5
years. After said timeframe, the letter and hard copies of all surveys will be shredded,
destroyed and properly disposed.
For the judicial survey, all district court judges for this Midwestern state were
provided the survey by the state court administrator, who approved this survey and
granted access to the district court judges. Participation for this study was voluntary as
noted in the consent letter. The letter also explained the purpose and process of this
study, and participants’ involvement rights. This notification explained that the purpose
of the research is to determine the judicial opinion on issues related to drug court versus
incarceration and judicial involvement through drug courts in the state. This letter also
assured the participants the research was not politically motivated or tied to any political
agenda.
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Due to the support of the State court administrator, the judicial survey was
administered via online survey. The survey link and consent letter were provided to the
state court administrator, who forwarded it to all judges within the Midwestern state. The
state court administrator does not have access to the survey results. The finalized study
will be provided to the state court administrator who will distribute to all district court
judges further ensuring confidentiality.
Instrumentalization and Operationalization Constructs
The survey for registered voters was developed by Dr. Giordano and adapted by
this researcher of only one question. The voter survey was designed to measure the level
of public acceptance for drug abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration by Dr. Giordano
(2014). Dr. Giordano conducted a pilot test to identify issues and resolve any potential
problems when the larger population was sampled (Giordano, 2014). The survey was
tested for both validity and reliability (Giordano, 2014). Dr. Giordano used probability
sampling for internal validity and measured reliability using Cronbach’s alpha set at .70,
which was met (Giordano, 2014).
The judicial survey was developed by this researcher based on this researcher’s
personal experience within the criminal justice legal system. The judicial sample survey
was more complex as there were only 116 district court judges at the time of this study.
However, there are 38 senior status judges throughout this Midwestern state. Judicial
sample surveys will be provided to all senior status judges to test for validity and
reliability.
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For RQ1, “Does an individual’s political ideology influence their support for
funding of specialty drug courts?,” the dependent variable is “support for drug court.”
This is measured by the survey asking whether the participant supports drug court
(treatment) or incarceration. This variable will be scored as 1 for treatment, 2 for
incarceration. There is one independent variable, political party identity. This
independent variable is defined as the following recognized political parties: Democrat,
Republican. The variable will be scored as follows: Democrat (1); Republican (2).
For RQ2, “What affect does public opinion and support for or against drug courts
affect judges sentencing defendants to drug court as opposed to prison?” the dependent
variable is “support for drug court.” This is measured by the survey asking whether the
participant supports drug court (treatment) or incarceration. This variable will be scored
as 1 for treatment, 2 for incarceration. There are several independent variables in RQ2.
The first is length of time as a district court judge. This variable is scored as follows: 0-5
years (1); 6-10 years (2); 11-20 years (3); 21+ years (4). The second variable is prior
drug court experience. This variable is yes (1) or no (0). The third variable is prior drug
court experience, defined and scored as yes (1) or no (0). The fourth variable is whether
public views affect support for sentencing a defendant to drug court. This variable is
defined and scored as yes (1) or no (0).
For RQ3, “Are judges affected by public views sentencing a defendant to drug
court?,” again the dependent variable is “drug court support” utilizing the same question
from the judicial survey of treatment (1) or incarceration (0). There are two independent
variables for RQ3. First, the independent variable is which political party did the

41
governor belong to who appointed judge. This is defined and scored as Democrat (1) or
Republican (2). The second independent variable is defined as if they are influenced by
the gubernatorial administration’s policies when making sentencing decisions. This is
scored as Yes (1) or No (0). Data were analyzed through SPSS with frequency tables and
logistic regression.
Threats to Validity
To eliminate any threats to external validity for the voter survey, this researcher
used the judicial district of the Midwestern state consisting of eleven counties.
Registered voter data was obtained from the Secretary of State as of April 1, 2019.
According to the Secretary of State’s website, in the eleven-county district there were
34.45% active Democrats, 28.40% active Republicans, 38.41% active no party, and
.0073% active Other. This judicial district is fairly evenly split between Democrats and
Republicans and has a large politically independent (no party) population, the sample
represents each of the political viewpoints, which will reduce any threats to external
validity.
For the voter survey, to reduce any threats to internal validity, probability
sampling was used to ensure random selection. Probability sampling is used to ensure
every possible member of a study’s population has an equal chance of being chosen to
participate in this study. To accomplish randomness, a list of random numbers was
created listing all possible participants. With this list, a random number was chosen as
the starting point with systematic sampling of every third participant.
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Because probability sampling is utilized to achieve randomness and the sample
size chosen reflects the statistical test chosen, logistic regression, any threats to construct
or statistical conclusion validity should be eliminated or significantly reduced.
For the judicial survey, internal validity will be reduced as the sample includes all
District Court judges within the Midwestern state. Probability sampling is done to ensure
every possible member of a study population has an equal chance to be selected to
participate in this study. In this case, every possible member of the study population does
have an equal chance to participate as all members of the study population were provided
this survey.
For external validity as it relates to the judicial survey, there have been only two
recognized political parties a governor can belong to: Democrat or Republican. Thus, all
District Court judges have either been appointed by a Democratic or Republic governor,
representing the two political outlooks. Reliability was measured via a pilot test. This
pilot test was administered to the senior district court judges, which number
approximately 38. These surveys were used in the final sample. Reliability was
measured using Cronbach’s alpha. SPSS was used to determine the coefficient of
reliability for this survey instrument with the reliability coefficient (alpha) set at .70,
which is acceptable reliability in SPSS.
Ethical Procedures
As this research should remain confidential, but also understanding the researcher
needs to track those who participated in the survey, each survey was assigned a number
which corresponded to a master list of names. Maintaining a list in the fashion reduces
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the chances individuals who have completed and submitted their survey, will not be
contacted with follow-up mailings requesting their participation. The master list of
names is maintained on the researcher’s password-protected computer, of which only this
researcher will have access. Because this is an anonymous survey and notice is being
provided via letter, a signed letter will not be required to maintain confidentiality of the
survey participants; however, as a master list of participants will be kept, the finalized
study will be provided to participants. This master list is kept separate from the surveys
with no identifying information from the survey to the notecard. All hard copies of the
survey will remain in a locked cabinet for 5 years. After 5 years, hard copies of all
surveys will be shredded, destroyed, and properly disposed.
The judicial survey was implemented via online survey methods. The link to the
online survey was emailed by the State Court Administrator to the district court judges.
The online survey had no identifying information as this survey will remain confidential.
No identifying information was required, and all survey results are maintained by this
researcher with no access by the State Court Administrator to further ensure
confidentiality.
Summary
This research sought to predict public support for drug courts based on their
political ideology. The analysis is further developed through study of judicial opinion
related to drug courts and whether judges feel influenced by the public and gubernatorial
administration.
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Logistic regression analysis was chosen due to statistical assumptions and in order
to properly predict the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable, support
for drug courts. Judicial surveys were provided to all district court judges in a
Midwestern state; however, public surveys are provided only to registered voters in a
specific judicial district consisting of eleven counties. Data provided by the Secretary of
State as of April 2019 reflect a balance between Democrat and Republic registered voters
to combat threats to validity.
Ultimately, the research seeks to determine if drug courts are an endangered
project within the judicial system due to lack of funding. Funding is vital for drug court
sustainability. With funding and budgets tightening, what influence will the public have
on support for specific drug court programs. As the research has shown, the American
people have indicated something needs to be done by the government with the drug
problem. Views have changed toward support for treatment, rather than prison; however,
this is also split according to political party ideology. For those registered voters who
prefer incarceration over treatment, will their view change with the knowledge of judicial
oversight?
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine whether political party predicted
support for drug courts in a Midwestern state. Further, this study also set out to
determine or predict whether public support or the state’s gubernatorial policies affected
judicial support for drug courts. It was hypothesized an individual’s political ideology
would influence support for drug court, and for those who previously supported
incarceration, their support would increase for drug courts with the knowledge of judicial
oversight. Further, it was hypothesized public support for drug courts would influence
judges to sentence defendants to drug court and gubernatorial administration policies
affect judicial sentencing of defendants to drug court as opposed to prison.
Because this study was focused on dichotomous variables, binominal logistic
regression was used to assess whether political party predicted support for drug court and
whether drug court would be supported if there was court supervision. Binominal logistic
regression analysis was not able to be used for Hypotheses 3 and 4. These hypotheses
became research questions as results indicated all judges were supportive of drug court.
Hypothesis 4 became a research question as well as the results indicated judges were not
affected by the governor’s policies. Results of the analysis are presented and analyzed in
this chapter.
Pilot Study
Because this researcher developed the survey instrument for judicial data, a pilot
study was conducted at the same time as the main study was presented to the judges. No
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pilot study was necessary for the public survey, as this survey instrument had been
checked for reliability by Giordano (2014). The judicial pilot study data was provided by
senior status judges in this Midwestern state. At the time of the study, there were 38
senior status judges, and six completed the online survey.
Because the variables were dichotomous, Kuder-Richardson 20 analysis was
used, which measures the internal consistency at the dichotomous level (Allen, 2017).
Cronbach’s alpha is used to establish internal consistency when the variables are not
dichotomous; however, SPSS provides data analysis using Cronbach’s alpha. Thus, the
Kuder-Richardson 20 analysis utilized Cronbach’s alpha for analysis of internal
consistency. With 6 valid cases, Cronbach’s alpha was .581 as shown in Table 4.
Table 4:
Pilot Study-Reliability

Cronbach's Alpha Based on
Standardized Items

Cronbach's Alpha
.581

N of Items

.640

6

This test, in reviewing reliability, analyzes how well the variables will hold
together and whether the variables have a relationship with each other. This is done by
looking at the Cronbach’s alpha. The recommended value for Cronbach’s Alpha is .70
(Kline, 2005, p. 92). The results in Table 4, indicated a lower than recommended value
of .581 and .640. This is most likely due to the small sample size (n = 6).
An analysis of the relationship between the variables is shown in Table 5. Table 5
presents the correlation matrix, which is used to determine if there is internal consistency
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between the variables. This also helps determine whether the items are correlated to each
other to assist in determining reliability and internal consistency (Devellis, 2016).
Analyzing the matrix, a few variables indicated no relationship with the other variables.
For example, the variables pre- or post-adjudication for drug court and ever sentenced a
defendant to drug court both were below .581. However, these variables do not relate to
whether judges support drug court or are affected by other’s views of drug court.
Further, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .719 for pre- or post-adjudication and to .693
for ever sentencing a defendant to drug court (see Table 6). On the other hand, if the
other items are deleted, the consistency is decreased, specifically public views affecting
sentencing and political party of the governor who appointed.
Table 5
Variable Correlation Matrix

Length of time as a
judge
Pre or Post
Adjudication for Drug
Court
Ever assigned to Drug
Court
Ever sentenced def to
Drug Court
Public Views affect
sentencing
Political Party of Gov
who appointed

Pre or Post
Ever
Political
Length of Adjudication
Ever
sentenced
Public
Party of
time as a
for Drug
assigned to def to Drug Views affect Gov who
judge
Court
Drug Court
Court
sentencing appointed
1.000
-.316
.632
-.200
.316
.632
-.316

1.000

.250

-.316

.500

.250

.632

.250

1.000

-.316

.500

1.000

-.200

-.316

-.316

1.000

.316

-.316

.316

.500

.500

.316

1.000

.500

.632

.250

1.000

-.316

.500

1.000

48
Table 6
Cronbach’s Alpha If Item Deleted

Length of time as a judge
Pre or Post Adjudication
for Drug Court
Ever assigned to Drug
Court
Ever sentenced def to
Drug Court
Public Views affect
sentencing
Political Party of Gov
who appointed

Scale Mean if Scale Variance
Item Deleted if Item Deleted
4.83
3.767
7.33
2.667

Corrected
Cronbach’s
Item-Total
Alpha if Item
Correlation
Deleted
.210
.575
.158
.719

8.00

2.800

.694

.387

7.83

4.567

-.267

.693

8.33

2.667

.791

.344

7.00

2.800

.694

.387

The data analysis from the pilot test surveys showed no significant concerns with
relationship and consistency. The items reflecting no relationship were not controlling in
this study. This sample was small, which presents a threat to internal validity.
Originally, the threat to internal validity was reduced because the sample included every
district court judge within the Midwestern state. But only six of the 38 senior status
district court judges responded to the survey, which affected internal validity. However,
with the small sample size and the instrument being researcher-developed, it was
determined that the survey instrument data could be utilized.
Data Collection
Participants for the public survey were chosen from a list provided by the
secretary of state of registered eligible voters in the 11 counties that comprised the
specific judicial district. A total of 238,000 registered voters were eligible as
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participants. A total of 1,000 surveys were mailed from October 2019 through January
2020. A first mailing of 500 surveys were sent in early October 2019 and a second
mailing of 500 surveys were sent in early November 2019. Of those eligible participants
in the first mailing, reminder surveys were sent in December 2019, and reminder surveys
were mailed to eligible participants in the second mailing in late January 2020.
In total, 107 public surveys were returned. One survey was not usable because it
was returned by a caretaker, indicating the eligible participant was not mentally capable
of completing the survey; thus, a total of 106 viable and completed surveys were used.
For demographics, several of the participants chose not to answer, especially when it
came to political party. For gender, 102 participants responded, most were female
(57.8%, see Table 7). There were 103 participants who reported their race. Table 8
shows that most participants were Caucasian/White 97.1%, with one Hispanic 1%, one
Asian 1%, and Other 1%.

Table 7
Frequency Table for Gender

Valid

Missing
Total

Female
Male
Total
System

Frequency
59
43
102
4
106

Percent Valid Percent
55.7
57.8
40.6
42.2
96.2
100.0
3.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
57.8
100.0

50
Table 8
Frequency Table for Race

Valid

Other
Caucasian/White
Hispanic
Asian
Total
Missing System
Total

Frequency Percent Valid Percent
1
.9
1.0
100
94.3
97.1
1
.9
1.0
1
.9
1.0
103
97.2
100.0
3
2.8
106
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
1.0
98.1
99.0
100.0

Far less participants reported their political party. Of the 106 responses, Table 6
shows only 67 participants reported their political party affiliation (see Table 9). The
Democratic party was reported most often with 58.2% of responses, with 41.8%
Republicans. Thirty-nine participants chose either no response or marked “none” for
political party affiliation.
Table 9
Frequency Table for Political Party

Valid

Missing
Total

Democrat
Republican
Total
System

Frequency
39
28
67
39
106

Percent Valid Percent
36.8
58.2
26.4
41.8
63.2
100.0
36.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
58.2
100.0

At the time of this study, there were 116 district court judges or senior status
district court judges within this Midwestern state. The survey was administered via
electronic survey and sent via the state court administrator in November 2019. A
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reminder email was sent to the chief justices of the judicial districts in January 2020. The
typical demographics of age, gender and race were not used with the judicial participants
as age, gender, and race were not applicable to this portion of the study.
Of the 116 eligible judicial participants, 45 responded. As shown in Table 10, 39
of the respondents were district court judges (86.7%), and six were senior status judges
(13.3%). The length of time as a judge did vary considerably (see Table 11). Table 8
provides the length of time participants had been on the bench as district court judges.
Eighteen judges were relatively new with 0-5 years, followed by 11 judges with 11-20
years of experience, nine with 6-10 years of judicial experience, and seven with 20 years
or more judicial experience. Forty-two of the 45 judicial participants responded to which
political party the governor belonged to who appointed them to the bench. Most (66.7%)
were appointed by a Republican governor (see Table 12).
Table 10
Frequency Table for District Court or Senior Status

Valid

Senior Status Judge
District Court Judge
Total

Frequency Percent Valid Percent
6
13.3
13.3
39
86.7
86.7
45

100.0

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
13.3
100.0
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Table 11
Frequency Table for Length of Time as a Judge

Valid

0-5 years
6-10 years
11-20 years
20+ years
Total

Frequency
18
9
11
7
45

Percent Valid Percent
40.0
40.0
20.0
20.0
24.4
24.4
15.6
15.6
100.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
40.0
60.0
84.4
100.0

Table 12
Frequency Table for Political Party of Governor Who Appointed Judge

Valid

Missing
Total

Democrat
Republican
Total
System

Frequency
14
28
42
3
45

Percent Valid Percent
31.1
33.3
62.2
66.7
93.3
100.0
6.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
33.3
100.0

Results
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis one states that an individual’s political ideology influences their
support for funding of specialty drug courts. Binary logistic regression was performed to
determine the effects of political party on the likelihood that participants would support
drug court/treatment. The logistic regression model was a good fit and statistically
significant at .001., χ(3) = 11.218, p = .001 (see Table 13).
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The Model Summary provided additional information on the usefulness of this
model (see Table 14). The Cox & Snell R Square test is .154 and Nagelkerke R square
test is .221. These two values, when read as a percentage, suggest the variability of the
dependent variable explained by the independent variable, which for this study was
between 15% to 22% in variability (see Table 14).
Table 13
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

Step 1

Step
Block
Model

Chi-square
11.218
11.218
11.218

df
1
1
1

Sig.
.001
.001
.001

Table 14
Model Summary
-2 Log
Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R
Step
likelihood
R Square
Square
a
1
68.687
.154
.221
Note. a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates
changed by less than .001.
Logistic regression attempts to predict whether something will happen and
estimates the probability of the event. Political party did add significantly to the model at
.002, so it was statistically significant. In this study, when looking at the percentage
accuracy in the classification, 71.6% were correctly classified, thus the probability of
political party determining treatment or prison was correct 71.6% of the time (see Table
15). Political party also is statistically significant when locating at the Wald test result
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(see Table 16). For Political Party, Wald = 9.871, p = .002, this is statistically significant,
hence, it contributes to the equation.
Table 15
Classification Table
Predicted
Treatment v.tougher
approach
Observed
Treatment v.tougher
approach

Step 1

Tougher
approach
Tougher approach
Treatment

0
0

Treatment
19
48

Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
.0
100.0
71.6

Note. a. The cut value is .500
Table 16
Variables in the Equation

Step 1

a

Political
Party
Constant

B
-1.917

S.E.
.610

Wald
9.871

1.917

.479

16.017

df
1
1

95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
.002
.147
.044
.486
.000

6.800

Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Political Party.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis two states an individual who previously supported incarceration, will
support Drug Court when knowing there is judicial oversight. Binary logistic regression
was performed again to determine if court oversight would affect participants would
support drug court/treatment. The logistic regression model was a good fit and
statistically significant at .000., χ(3) = 39.367, p = .000 (See Table 17).
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The Model Summary provides additional information on the usefulness of this
model. The Cox & Snell R Square test is .336 and Nagelkerke R square test is .554.
These two values, when read as a percentage, suggest the variability of the dependent
variable explained by the independent variable, which for this study was between 33% to
55% (see Table 18).
Table 17
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

Step 1

Step
Block
Model

Chi-square
39.367
39.367
39.367

df
1
1
1

Sig.
.000
.000
.000

Table 18
Model Summary

-2 Log
Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R
Step
likelihood
R Square
Square
a
1
50.286
.336
.554
Note. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed
by less than .001.
As shown in Table 19, 85.4% of participants were correctly classified. Court
supervision did add significantly to the model at .000, p =.001, so it was statistically
significant. In this study, when looking at the percentage accuracy in the classification,
85.4% were correctly classified, thus the probability of court supervision determining
treatment or prison was correct 85.4% of the time reflected in Table 19. Court
supervision also is statistically significant when reviewing the Wald test result (see Table
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20). For Treatment or Incarceration, Wald= 16.747, p = .000, this is statistically
significant, hence, it contributes to the equation.
Table 19
Classification Tables

Observed
If court supervised:

Step 1

Predicted
If court supervised
Drug
Percentage
Prison
Treatment
Correct
16
1
94.1
13
66
83.5
85.4

Prison
Drug Treatment

Overall Percentage

Note. The cut value is .500
Table 20
Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
B
Step 1

a

S.E.

Treatment v.
tougher
approach

4.397

Constant

-.208

Wald

1.075 16.747

.373

.309

Df

Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper

1

.000 81.231

1

.578

9.888 667.33
9

.812

Note. a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Treatment v. tougher approach.
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis three states the more public support for drug courts will influence
judges to sentence defendants to drug court. Hypothesis 4 states gubernatorial
administration policies do affect judges sentencing defendants to drug court as opposed to
prison. Binary logistic regression was not able to be used to analyze either hypothesis.
As noted in Table 21, almost all respondents indicated public views did not affect
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sentencing a defendant, with 42 of the 45 respondents indicating they were not influenced
by public views of drug court. All respondents agreed they were not influenced by the
gubernatorial administration’s policies (see Table 22). Prediction, through binary logistic
regression, would not have been possible, as a high proportion of responses in the
observed variable. With the frequencies, the variables were almost absolute. As
hypothesis was not able to be tested in this method, hypothesis 3 and 4 have now become
research questions: Are judges affected by public views when sentencing a defendant to
drug court? Are judges affected by the gubernatorial policies of the administration who
appointed the judge to the bench?
Table 21
Frequency Table of Public Views Affect Sentencing

Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

No

42

93.3

93.3

93.3

Yes

3

6.7

6.7

100.0

Total

45

100.0

100.0

Table 22
Frequency Table if Feel influenced by Governor

Valid

No

Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Percent
45
100.0
100.0
100.0

The judicial survey also provided an opportunity for participants to write anything
else they were willing to share. While there could be response bias in both questions
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about whether drug court is effective and whether they support drug court, the written
responses support a conclusion there was not response bias in this question.
Judicial participants commented drug court was a cost-effective way to
rehabilitate non-violent offenders, it was economical, and proven to save money. One
judicial participant indicated drug courts and other community-based programs were “a
no-brainer regardless of your political affiliation.” There seemed to be an overriding
consensus this program worked and was beneficial to society. Further, participants
stating in areas where there was not a drug court, they wished there were. To create and
sustain a drug court, funding is necessary. There was also a consensus from the
respondents, the legislature should fund these programs as they were necessary and were
effective.
Two hypotheses were tested in this research, and the remaining two hypotheses
became research questions. For Hypothesis 1, the overall model, with the independent
variable of political party, was found to be statistically significant using chi-square test
with 1 df, N = 67 and a statistic of 11.218, at a significance level of .002. For Hypothesis
2, the overall model with independent variable of court supervision, was found to be
statistically significant using chi-square test with 1 df, N = 67, and a statistic of 39.367, at
a significance level of .000.
As all respondents indicated there was no effect of public views of drug court,
when it comes to judges sentencing a defendant to drug court, they will not be influenced
by public opinion or thoughts on drug court. Additionally, all respondents indicated that
they were not influenced by the governor when sentencing defendants to drug court, thus
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the policies of the gubernatorial office have no effect on judges’ decisions to sentence a
defendant to drug court. Judicial respondents were supportive of drug courts in general
and also, via written responses, felt financial backing would be important to promote and
maintain drug courts.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine whether political party would
predict support for drug courts. Results from the data analysis indicated there is a
relationship between political party and support for drug courts. Further, the data
indicated overwhelming support for drug treatment when there was court supervision and
even supported drug treatment for those who indicated prison previously, when there was
court supervision. Judges overwhelmingly supported drug courts. Data indicated judges
were not influenced at all from the governor’s policies, and a significant majority
indicated public views on drug court did not affect their support or decisions.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In 2010, the total number of drug arrests in the United States was approximately
1.6 million, where it held steady except for a slight drop of about 5,000 arrests in 2017
(“Drug War Facts," n.d.). The highest number of arrests were in 2005 and 2006, with
over 1.8 million arrests (“Drug War Facts,” n.d.). Treatment options, especially drug
court, were implemented late 1988 continuing to this day (Warren, 2009). The main
purpose of this research was to predict whether political party would support drug courts.
It also studied whether those who previously supported prison might change to support
drug court if court supervision was involved in treatment. Finally, judicial support for
drug court was determined, along with whether public and the governor’s office affected
their support for drug courts. The public were more inclined to support treatment over
incarceration to address this problem. The judicial respondents significantly agreed drug
court was effective, some had previously been assigned to a drug court, and others had
even sentenced a defendant to drug court. Results also indicated political party does
predict support for drug court. Further, those who supported incarceration chose to
support treatment if it was court supervised. Finally, judicial results indicated unanimous
support for drug court, little to no influence by the public, and zero influence by the
governor.
Interpretation of the Findings
Drug courts are controversial because they utilize the court system, which
requires governmental funding which comes from politicians. Politicians are the elected
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body of the federal and state government by registered voters. Drug courts can be
economically beneficial, especially when there are large pools of federal grant funds
available (Hoffman, 2012). Drug courts provide the ability for federal grant funding, plus
using less taxpayer monies by diverting funds from incarceration to these problemsolving courts. However, though programs such as drug court rely on funding to survive
and the judicial branch requires funding to function, governmental funding is split among
a variety of issues, concerns, and bodies, including education and infrastructure. The
difficulty for elected politicians is to determine how to divide this funding; therefore, this
study sought to determine whether political party would predict support for drug courts
and whether the public viewpoint can assist drug courts and the criminal justice system
with their support.
Determining whether governmental bodies find treatment and drug court viable
can be done by looking at the National Drug Control Budget released by the current
executive branch in May 2017 (ONDCP, 2017). The White House requested a budget of
$99.9 million set aside for drug prevention and treatment, including drug courts
(ONDCP, 2017). In fact, from fiscal years 2016-2018, funding for treatment has
consistently increased while law enforcement funding has remained stagnant (ONDCP,
2017). Included in the funding is the availability of federal grant funds. The largest
segment of available grants funds for drug court is the Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. For these grants, federal funds
cannot cover more than 75% of the program’s total costs, thus the funds must be matched
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or made “in-kind” some other way (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2016). The “in kind”
funding must come from some other source, such as local government funds.
To obtain local government funds, drug courts must show a success rate or at least
impact. This allows a politician to point to lower recidivism rates where there is a drug
court program, which could support funding. An analysis of recidivism from 1994-2015
revealed that 77% of offenders were rearrested within 5 years of release, and 29% were
arrested for a violent crime, with a main predictor being substance abuse (Durose et al.,
2015; Katsiyannis, et al, 2018). With substance abuse being a main predictor of
recidivism, drug courts could be a solution, if there can be public support. If there is
public support, funding should follow from the legislative body.
Based on the public’s responses in this study, the drug problem is getting worse
and treatment needs to occur. This study further validates Blendon and Young (1998)
and Giordano (2014), who both found most participants believed the drug problem was
getting worse and public support for drug treatment if court supervised. This study also
further supported Giordano’s contention of support for treatment over incarceration in the
form of drug court. This study’s results showed support for drug treatment with court
supervision both from those who previously supported treatment but also from those who
previously supported incarceration.
Limitations of the Study
The first weakness for the public survey is it was conducted via U.S. mail. Of the
1,000 surveys mailed, few were returned (107), and even fewer were able to be utilized
because participants did not provide information such as which political party they are
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registered to vote. There may be several reasons for not completing and returning the
surveys. Addresses were provided via the Secretary of State who compiles the list of
registered voters, but there was no guarantee the registered voters’ addresses were listed
correctly when they were provided to the auditor or if the registered voter still resided at
the address. Second, eligible participants could have simply thrown away the survey.
The data collection process took place the months prior to the primaries and caucuses for
the 2020 Presidential election. Individuals may have mistaken the mailing for political
advertisements.
Second, of concern, there was little demographic representation of race. While
race was not a predictor, it would have been interesting to see how race and political
party ideology may have affected the results. The predominant race was Caucasian;
therefore, the weakness of this study includes lack of diversity in the participants. This
also could have been a result of the research design itself. The participant pool included
only registered voters. Diversity of the registered voter pool may be affected by a variety
of sociological issues, including certain racial populations who are ineligible to vote due
to criminal history and/or choose not to register to vote.
Third, of the participants, only 67 provided their political party. This study was
focused on whether political party predicted support for drug court. Failing to provide
political party contributed to the weakness of this study. Recommendations for the
future, could include obtaining the registered party from the Secretary of State directly
and reconfirming through the surveys from the participants’ response. This could be an
effective method to complete the political party component; however, may not be
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accurate. The Secretary of State’s information does not include when the registered voter
provided this information; therefore, the registered voter could have changed political
parties and not updated their information. The registered voter information was obtained
prior to the November presidential caucus/primary, which could have provided updated
or confirmed political party information for each voter.
At the time of data collection, there were 116 district court and senior status
district court judges, a response rate of 45 was considerably lower than anticipated.
There may be several reasons for the lack of participation.
First, judges may have been apprehensive sharing their opinions. The notification
of this research and the judicial survey came from the State Court Administrator. This
was done to show potential judicial participants the survey was vetted and approved if
they chose to participate. Unfortunately, this may have had another effect. Potential
judicial participants may not have participated due to concerns of confidentiality.
Despite every attempt at ensuring confidentiality and to reduce any fears of responses
becoming public or shared with the State Court Administrator, judges may have felt the
need to answer a certain way, rather than how they felt or not participate at all.
Second, if the above is true, the study is weakened as every judge indicated
support for drug court. This may or may not be true. This portion of the study was
originally planned as qualitative to obtain individual judge’s feeling and provide an indepth analysis for or against drug courts. Instead, a quantitative study was developed
which could ensure confidentiality as the judicial participant would be free to answer the
questions due to anonymity as opposed to speaking individually with this researcher.
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However, as noted, as the survey was delivered via the State Court Administrator, judges
may have felt the survey was not confidential, affecting responses.
Recommendations for Future Research
For future research, continual depth into political party and philosophical views
should be studied. This research presents a baseline of political party ideology and
affiliation; however, whether political rhetoric affects the public’s view of drug court
would be most interesting. This study was conducted prior to the race for the 2020
Presidential election, future research could study whether presidential statements, rhetoric
and commentary affects public views toward substance abuse treatment in the form of
drug courts and incarceration.
Second, surveying a larger registered voter pool would be beneficial. Perhaps the
entire state rather than one judicial district for public views or even a judicial district in
another state. Research could compare registered voters in two different states. The same
would be true for judicial opinion as well. Future research could include a better method
to obtain participation, such as attending a judicial conference. This could likely increase
the amount of judicial participation and would be completed on paper as opposed to
online survey methods.
Future research should include more depth in the survey. While this study focused
on drug court support or not, it did not delve into the strength of this support. A
qualitative study could provide individualized answers, which could be followed up with
further questioning.
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The Judicial Branch should provide education to the public about drug court. As
French and Raven (1959) noted power as influence or influencing psychological change.
The power of the electorate could provide the support for local drug courts if it is
educated. There is no power without knowledge. Regardless of state or federal, most
judicial branches are not political and shy away from the politics; however, it stands to
reason if funding comes from the legislative branch, the judicial branch must use
knowledge and power together.
Implications and Conclusions
There is significant potential for positive social change with this study. First,
substance abusers have an effect on their family, themselves, and society in general.
Forms of substance abuse treatment are necessary to combat drug addiction. This study
provides an alternative to prison and provides an alternative for treatment. Drug Courts
address addiction. These courts can reduce the prison population and recidivism. It is not
perfect, but it is a start to combatting a serious drug addiction that is, according to the
public and judges, needs to be addressed. Most importantly, there is strong judicial and
public support for treatment and treatment alternatives. Drug Court can fill this void of
substance abuse treatment, while still providing oversight and sanctions if one fails to
complete treatment.
The legislature should listen to the public and listen to judges, who see firsthand
the devastating effects of substance abuse. Substance abuse wrecks families and society
is affected by the very criminal nature substance abuse entails. This study shows support
for specialty drug courts; however, funding is necessary. If funding is provided, those
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who have substance abuse issues may have a second chance by avoiding prison and
becoming a productive member of society.
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